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Unlike the past several years, the main focus of developments in
the law of workers' compensation during the 1988-1989 term was in the
legislative rather than the judicial arena. But like most years, the action
in the legislative arena was directly related to previous decisions in the
judicial arena. With very few exceptions, most of the major legislative
changes seem clearly intended to overrule recent appellate decisions.
Not every legislative action was of major import, to be sure. There
was a series of "housekeeping" measures following Act 938 of 1988,
mentioned in this forum last year' though not extensively discussed.
Many of these minor measures do not merit textual discussion and are
confined to the margin. 2 Several were intended to deal with the problems
created by the pending constitutional challenge to Act 9383; at this
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2. 1989 La. Acts No. 24, § 1 deletes a specific reference to La. R.S. 23:1351 in
§ 1201(F) of the Act, and replaces it with a reference to an appeal "as provided by law."
Similarly, 1989 La. Acts No. 25, § I makes a general reference to the "provisions of law
governing disputes" over medical care rather than specific statutory references. 1989 La.
Acts No. 27, § I deletes a reference to the "presiding" hearing officer with respect to
the authority of the Director to organize and direct the necessary administrative work to
support the hearing officer system. 1989 La. Acts No. 28, § 1 adds a provision to Section
1168 of the Act, authorizing forfeiture to the Director of any security posted by a self-
insured employer, in the event of the employer's default, and authorizing the Director to
use the funds so generated to pay the claims of its employees. 1989 La. Acts No. 29,
§ 1 repeals Section 1181 of the Act, relative to security to be posted by foreign employers,
thereby equalizing the treatment of Louisiana and out-of-state employers as to security
for payment of compensation. 1989 La. Acts No. 43, § 1 changes slightly the qualifications
of hearing officers, and the restrictions applicable to them. The specific authority for
gubernatorial appointment of such officers is deleted, and the general prohibition against
practicing law is reduced to a prohibition against practicing "worker's compensation law"
while employed as a hearing officer.
3. 1989 La. Acts No. 23, § 2 is a "failsafe" enactment, restoring the provisions
repealed by Act 938 of 1988, in the event that the pertinent portions of the 1988 enactment
are declared unconstitutional. 1989 La. Acts No. 260, § 1 delays from July 1, 1989 to
January 1, 1990 the effective date of the administrative hearing officer system created by
1989 La. Acts No. 938. A joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment to
address the arguments raised in the litigation questioning the constitutionality of the act
was proposed but failed of passage.
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writing, the administrative hearing officer system which it contains has
been held constitutional by a state district court and an appeal is pending.
Perhaps the only substantive change wrought by these minor measures
is the elimination of the internal appeal in the hearing officer system
(from the original hearing officer to a three-officer panel) prior to an
appeal to the proper intermediate appellate court.
4
There were also isolated substantive revisions relative to the con-
fidentiality of the employment records of an individual' and the appli-
cation of comparative negligence to the claim of a subrogee.
6
But clearly the major news on the legislative front was the passage
of Act 454, to be effective January 1, 1990. Conceived and lobbied by
the forces of the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, and
containing a number of proposed changes which had been through the
legislative mill unsuccessfully in prior years, these amendments make
very significant changes in the fabric of the Act. The enactment is so
significant that it should probably be the subject of a separate article,
and the writer can only discuss the changes briefly in the space allowed
in this symposium. With a few exceptions, the changes will be addressed
in the order in which they appear in the bill and therefore in the Act.
Definitions
Certain definitions are amended, with an eye toward eliminating
coverage for some of the more troublesome kinds of work-related in-
juries. The term "accident" itself is amended, with an addition to the
present definition requiring that an injury which is suffered must be
"more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration." ' 7
This additional language is clearly intended to reverse the established
4. 1989 La. Acts No. 26, § 1.
5. 1989 La. Acts No. 530, § 1 clarifies the proper use of employment records,
authorizing their release to state or federal prosecutors or for the purpose of calculating
offsets against benefits. Moreover, their proper use within the litigation itself is also
permitted. The same act creates a fraud section within the office of the Director.
6. 1989 La. Acts No. 771, § 1 enacts Civil Code article 2324.2, which is a general
provision that when a personal injury claimant's recovery is diminished by the application
of comparative negligence, the claim of a legal or conventional subrogee must be diminished
by the same percentage. While a later portion of the same act, permitting the parties to
waive this result in a settlement, refers to a legal or conventional subrogee under the
workers' compensation act, it is not absolutely clear that Act 771 will govern workers'
compensation. The Act originally referred to subrogation as the basis for the intervenor's
claim, but the reference was later repealed. Thus the precise basis for the intervenor's
claim may not be subrogation. See 2 W. Malone and H. Johnson, Louisiana Workers'
Compensation Law and Practice § 371, in 14 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1980)
[hereafter Malone and Johnson].
7. Section 1021(1), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I.
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trend in the jurisprudence to permit coverage for disability which appears
to be clearly work-related but does not fit the statutory definition of
accident." Ironically, the amendment comes at a time when some recent
cases appear to be running counter to the trend. 9
Other changes to the definitions in the Act address the very trou-
blesome areas of mental disability and vascular accidents (heart attack
and stroke). The amendments specify that mental injury or illness alleged
to be due to mental stress "shall not be considered a personal injury
by accident" that is work-related unless the mental injury was the result
of a "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the em-
ployment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.""' If
applied as written, this amendment would sharply curtail awards for
disability allegedly due to relatively long-term job-related stress, in par-
ticular instances such as that typified by the recent Sparks decision
discussed later in this symposium article." The writer has been critical
of this jurisprudential trend, especially because repeated cautions with
respect to the difficult causation issues so created have not been heeded.' 2
The new language, however, arguably would preserve compensation awards
for certain types of mental stress as to which the difficult causation
issues are probably not present because the stress is acute rather than
chronic. 'a
The same standard of proof is to be applied to mental injury caused
by physical injury, which is not compensable unless demonstrated by
"clear and convincing evidence.' ' 4 Moreover, such a mental injury is
not compensable unless it is diagnosed by a psychiatrist or psychologist
8. See generally Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, § 216.
9. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Southern Plastics, Inc., 535 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1223 (1989) (worker in plastics plant claimed problems
in air quality in work environment caused her respiratory problems, but court believed
non-work factors were in fact to blame; court affirmed denial of claim, in part on basis
of lack of showing of "accident"). But see Houston v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical
Corp., 531 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988) (cervical problems apparently related
to fact that worker had to spend great portion of time at work with head turned at 45
degree angle; sufficient showing of accident).
10. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § I.
11. Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hosp. and Clinic, 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989),
see infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
12. Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 235 (Supp. 1989).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equip. Co., 482 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1986) (personal secretary heard gunshot in adjacent office occupied by her boss; he
had committed suicide and died twenty minutes later in her arms; resulting mental disability
compensable); Jones v. City of New Orleans, 514 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (1987) (claimant was home health care provider who received
death threat on a certain day when she made trip to housing project, and thereafter
suffered disability anxiety).
14. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(c), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1.
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and the diagnosis meets the criteria established in the applicable manual
of mental disorders (commonly known as DSM-III). 5 Once again, this
amendment is aimed at a particular line of cases, 6 probably not as
worrisome as the so-called mental/mental cases but still a source of
concern to the employer community. Since the causal link between
employment event and disability is often clearer in such cases, this
amendment is probably less necessary than the mental/mental amend-
ment.
As for vascular accidents, they are defined to be non-compensable
unless there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the physical stress
on the job was "extraordinary and unusual in comparison to the stress
or exertion experienced by the average employee in that occupation"
and the physical job stress was the "predominant and major cause" of
the vascular accident.' 7 All good scholars of compensation law know
that this amendment is aimed at the established line of heart attack
cases, the most recent of which is discussed later in this symposium."
Once again, there is likely to be a restriction in compensation awards
if the amendment is applied as written.
It is difficult to reach a conclusion as to the wisdom of these
amendments. On the one hand, there should always be concern when
the coverage of the Act is trimmed and tailored to fit the particular
interpretations of the day, which are thought to be causing higher rates
for employers. If the system is generally sound, it should have broad
coverage. Moreover, it is extremely likely that mental stress and heart
attack cases are far down the list of factors that may cause whatever
evils are perceived in the present compensation system.
On the other hand, particularly with the mental/mental cases, the
judiciary had failed to be sufficiently concerned about the multiple
streams of causation which might join to cause disability in long-term
mental stress situations, and perhaps some adjustment may have been
appropriate. It is as important that the compensation system exclude
15. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(d), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1.
16. See, e.g., Ducharme v. Garland Belongia, 544 So. 2d 590 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1989) (truck driver involved in serious accident, but escaped relatively unscathed; kidney
contusion caused some minor problems, but major disabling problem was mental distress,
including fear of returning to the road; court held post-traumatic stress disorder should
be considered an "injury" under the Act); Westley v. Land & Offshore, 523 So. 2d 812
(La. 1988) (fall from high construction area caused residual mental disability). Most of
the decisions in this area involve situations which are likely to produce the same result
even under the more stringent standard. The standard may, however, change the result
in cases in which the call has been much closer. See, e.g., Williams v. State of Louisiana,
489 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
17. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(e), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 1.




those disabling conditions that are not caused by employment as it is
that it include those conditions which are so caused. How to tell the
difference is always the rub. Whether these amendments are part of the
solution or become a part of the problem remains to be seen.
Basic Coverage
In an attempt to strengthen the role of employer defenses under
the Act, the amendments purport to elevate one of these defenses to a
part of the claimant's prima facie case and to provide an additional
basis upon which the employer may deny compensation in the other.
A new subsection to Section 1031 declares that an injury is not considered
as having arisen out of employment "if the injured employee was engaged
in horseplay at the time of the injury."1 9 Another new subsection pro-
vides that an injury is not considered as arising out of employment if
the "employer can establish that the injury arose out of a dispute with
another person or employee over matters unrelated to the injured em-
ployee's employment.' '20
Though the difference in the two amendments is probably not in-
tentional, the former amendment arguably requires an employee to dem-
onstrate that he was not engaged in "horseplay" in order to discharge
his burden of proving that the injury arose out of the employment,
while the latter places the burden of proof on the employer to dem-
onstrate a non-employment dispute leading to injury. There is an obvious
problem resulting from the insertion of a slang word (horseplay) without
definition. Perhaps the judiciary will say that it cannot be defined, but
"we know it when we see it."'21
Once again, there are recent cases at which these amendments are
aimed. 22 There is probably more to recommend the second amendment
than the first, and perhaps therefore the placing of the burden of proof
on the employer in that instance is not desirable. The first amendment
19. La. R.S. 23:1031(C), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2.
20. La. R.S. 23:1031(D), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2.
21. Or perhaps it will be said that the term is entirely justified because it is used
by the eminent authors of Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, as the heading for their
§ 197.
22. See, e.g., Robertson v. Stratagraph, Inc., 458 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984)
(injury due to epoxy resin glue placed on workbench by fellow worker as practical joke
which caused burns to claimant's buttocks); Bennett v. Industrial Welding & Fabricating,
Inc., 411 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (Russian roulette); Blakeway v. Lefebure
Corp., 393 So. 2d 928 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 610 (1981) (dive into
shallow end of pool after night of dining and drinking while on business trip). As to
non-employment disputes, see in particular Raybol v. Louisiana State Univ., 520 So. 2d
724 (La. 1988), criticized in part in Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments in
the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L. Rev. 549, 551-54 (1988).
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re-introduces the notion of employee fault into a presumably no-fault
system, with a very broad definitional base and in a factual setting
which is very common and endemic to the workplace.
There is also an amendment which narrows the coverage of the
occupational disease provision. It specifically excludes from any coverage
"degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis of any type, mental
illness, and heart-related or perivascular disease." ' 23 No doubt exclusion
of the latter two "diseases" are added to be certain that the restrictive
amendments on this subject under the definition of injury accomplish
their purpose. But the specific exclusion of certain diseases from coverage
starts the Act back down a road which it has traveled before. Prior to
1952, there was no coverage for occupational disease at all. Between
1952 and 1975, there was coverage only for a specific schedule of
diseases. And finally, in 1975, there was general coverage, though under
a very restrictive definition.
24
In each instance, the judiciary has given the most liberal interpre-
tation possible to the pertinent statutes to permit coverage of the dis-
abling condition when causation in the workplace is clear. The current
amendments start us back in the other direction, probably with the same
judicial result to follow.
A separate amendment specifically excludes compensation under the
Act for any employee covered by the FELA, the LHWCA "or any of
its extensions," or the Jones Act. 2'
Tort Immunity
Predictably, tort immunity is shored up by the amendments. A
sentence added to Section 1032(A)26 is clearly intended to stop the
development of any "dual capacity" theory as a basis for permitting a
tort suit by an employee against his employer, and thereby to overrule
the decision in Ducote v. Albert,27 criticized in this forum last year.
2
1
23. La. R.S. 23:1031.1(B), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2.
24. See generally Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 220.
25. La. R.S. 23:1035.2, added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2. This amendment, at
least as to the FELA and the Jones Act, is probably unnecessary in light of present La.
R.S. 23:1037. As to the LHWCA, which presumably has "concurrent" application to
certain Louisiana workers with state compensation law, there are certain to be difficult
interpretive cases.
26. "This exclusive remedy is exclusive of all claims, including all claims that might
arise against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner
or employee of such employer or principal under any dual capacity theory or doctrine."
La. R.S. 23:1032(A), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2.
27. 521 So. 2d 399 (La. 1988).
28. Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La.
L. Rev. 549, 558-60 (1988).
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This amendment seems sound, as it preserves the broad reach of the
Act in favor of compensation remedies to employees in an area in which
there might have been years of difficult interpretive jurisprudence.
There is also an attempt in an amendment to Section 106129 to
overrule, or at least severely limit, the holding in Berry v. Holston Well
Service30 and its impact on the availability of .the statutory employer
defense. The amendment attacks Berry directly by declaring that the
fact that the work in question is "specialized or nonspecialized, is
extraordinary construction or simple maintenance, is work that is usually
done by contract or by the principal's direct employee, or is routine or
unpredictable, shall not prevent the work" from being considered a part
of the principal's trade, business, or occupation. This does not, one
supposes, mean that these factors are not to be considered; rather, it
appears to mean that no single factor (such as specialized versus non-
specialized work) may be used to defeat the defense of immunity raised
by the principal.
While this defense is one extremely dear to the hearts of the employer
community, employers were perhaps less hurt by the recent cases than
they believed. There have been a remarkable number of cases in which
the Berry "test" has been satisfied, even on a summary basis.3" This
particular portion of the Act, however, seems destined for tinkering
every several years.
Employer Defenses
A lengthy amendment strengthening the intoxication defense is also
included in Act 454. A fairly standard set of presumptions based on
blood alcohol content is enacted,32 along with a presumption based on
29. La. R.S. 23:1061, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
30. 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986).
31. Humphrey v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 546 So. 2d 520 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989) (summary judgment affirmed; vendor of bricks used own employees and decedent's
employer as delivery services); Mouton v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 545 So. 2d 1114
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment affirmed; nuclear security officer's duties
were shared by direct employees as well); Solomon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 539 So.
2d 715 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989) (summary judgment affirmed; maintenance and house-
keeping duties at offices of express delivery service; other direct employees had same
duties); Garrene v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 532 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988)
(summary judgment affirmed; boilermaker performing maintenance services; direct em-
ployees performed same services). See generally Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at
§ 364 (Supp. 1989), especially at note 59.150.
32. La. R.S. 23:1081(3)(a), (b), and (c), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3, provide
a presumption of non-intoxication at 0.05 percent blood alcohol level and of intoxication
at 0.10 percent or more. There is no presumption for levels in between these two, but
the evidence of blood alcohol level is admissible.
1989l
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use of certain controlled substances. 3 The employer is granted the right
to administer drug and alcohol testing, or demand that the employee
undergo such testing, under rigorous regulations.3 4 The employee may
decline, but is presumed to have been intoxicated if he does so." Most
importantly, once the employer has discharged the burden of proving
intoxication at the time of the accident, it is presumed that the accident
was caused by the intoxication.16 This last change most squarely addresses
the problem in the jurisprudence, since in many instances intoxication
has been clear and the court has used the causation requirement to deny
the defense.
3 7
There are a few concessions. The defense of intoxication does not
apply if the intoxication "resulted from activities which were in pursuit
of the employer's interests or in which the employer procured the in-
toxicating beverage or substance and encouraged its use during the
employee's work hours." 3 And, if a health care provider has delivered
services to a worker later found to be intoxicated, the employer has
the responsibility to pay for the medical expenses until the worker is
released from the acute care facility, at which point the obligation
terminates .9
While these amendments on intoxication are lengthy and detailed,
they are probably overdue. Even the original act incorporated some
employee fault, including intoxication, and the defense has never had
the reach that it was probably intended to have. In these times, the
defense probably needed strengthening.
Rights Upon Settlement of Judgment
Easily one of the most confusing aspects of the 1983 amendments
was the revision to Sections 1101, 1102, and 1103 of the Act. Clearly,
33. La. R.S. 23:1081(5), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3. The employer may
prove such drug use by a preponderance of the evidence. La. R.S. 23:1081(8), added by
1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
34. La. R.S. 23:1081(7)(a) and (9), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
35. La. R.S. 23:1081(7)(b), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
36. La. R.S. 23:1081(12), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
37. Some of the worst examples are Gaffney v. Saenger Theatre Partnership Ltd.,
539 So. 2d 1014 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (stagehand fell through opening in stage;
determined to have had 0.123 blood alcohol level; defense unsuccessful because there was
no proof of causal connection between intoxication and fall); Folse v. American Well
Control, 536 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 538 So. 2d 592 (1989)
(blood alcohol content of 0.16 following fatal accident; court recited significant alcohol
use by decedent and concluded he was in category of persons who would be "least
affected" by alcohol content in blood, and therefore insufficient proof of causation); Ray
v. Superior Iron Works and Supply Co., Inc., 284 So. 2d 140 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 286 So. 2d 365 (1973) (0.26 blood alcohol content, but defense denied on basis
that no causation was shown).
38. La. R.S. 23:1081(1)(b), amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
39. La. R.S. 23:1081(13), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3.
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the amendments were intended to strengthen the hand of the employer
and the compensation carrier in the case in which a tort suit by the
claimant is settled without the consent of the employer and the carrier.
Both the settling claimant (through the loss of "future" compensation
benefits unless there is a "buy back" by repayment of past benefits
paid) and the settling tortfeasor (through automatic payment of the
claim of the employer or carrier for past benefits paid) are subject to
sanctions for unauthorized settlements. Particularly with the overlay of
the attorney's fee issues raised by the decision in Moody v. Arabie,
4
0
these provisions have proven very difficult to apply.
The amendments in Act 454 do not solve the main problems, but
they do address some minor ones. They clarify the definition of a "third
person" who might be considered a tortfeasor. 41 They also specify that
the compensation responsibility beyond the tort award is applicable only
upon the required written approval and after the employer or carrier
receives a "dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid" in the
settlement, less attorney's fees and costs paid by the employee in the
prosecution of the tort claim. 42 In a surprising concession, Section 1103
was amended to provide that the employer's or carrier's credit out of
a tort award against future compensation obligations shall be reduced
"by the amount of attorney fees and court costs paid by the employee
in the third party suit."
43
A new subsection to Section 1103 overrules the decision in Brooks
v. Chicola,4 which was criticized in this forum last year for incorrectly
limiting the employer's or carrier's reimbursement to only those portions
of a quantum award that were denominated loss of wages or medical
expenses. 41 Until that decision, our courts had properly permitted re-
imbursement from the award regardless of the labels that might have
been attached to the award. The amendment properly restores the law
to that earlier reading.
An additional new subsection to Section 1103 clarifies the decision
in Moody v. Arabie by specifying that an intervenor is responsible only
for "reasonable legal fees and costs" incurred by the attorney retained
by the plaintiff, which shall not exceed one third of the intervenor's
40. 498 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1986).
41. La. R.S. 23:1101(C), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 3. A third person
includes "any party who causes injury to an employee" at the time of employment or
thereafter, provided the employer is obligated to pay benefits "because the injury by the
third party has aggravated the employment related injury."
42. La. R.S. 23:1102(B), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 4.
43. La. R.S. 23:1103(A)(1), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 4.
44. 514 So. 2d 7 (La. 1987).
45. Johnson, Workers' Compensation, Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La.
L. Rev. 549, 560-64 (1988).
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recovery for his pre-judgment payments to the claimant.4 6 The employee
as an intervenor is not responsible for the employer's attorney's fees
attributable to post-judgment damages, nor is the employer as an in-
tervenor responsible for the attorney's fees attributable to the credit that
the employer or carrier gets for future compensation benefits.
47
Finally, subsections C(2) and C(3) of Section 1102 are repealed
outright, removing their discussion of unreasonable refusal to settle and




An interesting provision of uncertain import is the new Section 1212
enacted by Act 454.49 It specifies that payment "by any person or entity
other than a direct payment by the employee, a relative or friend of
the employee," of medical expenses otherwise owed by the employer
extinguishes the claim against the employer or carrier for those expenses.
This provision is specifically stated not to be a violation of Section
1163, which otherwise prohibits any direct or indirect charging of the
cost of compensation to the employee. However, if the employer and
the employee (or the spouse's employer and the employee's spouse) have
shared the cost of premiums for health and accident insurance (which
is the most likely source of the payment envisioned by the section), the
offset applies only in the same percentage in which the employer paid
the premiums.
Duration of Temporary Total Disability Benefits
The "gap" created by the failure of the 1983 amendments to revise
the definition of temporary total disability (TTD) benefits, and the
ensuing jurisprudential use of the pre-1983 standards to award seemingly
unlimited temporary total disability benefits, was also addressed. The
more stringent post-1983 standard for total and permanent disability
benefits was enacted verbatim in the TTD portion of the act, a logical
inconsistency insisted upon by the proponents.5 0 The only difference
between temporary benefits based on total disability and permanent
benefits based on total disability is their duration, not the extent of
disability. Thus there was no real need to reiterate the "extent of
disability" standard from the total and permanent disability section. A
mere reference would have sufficed.
46. La. R.S. 23:1103(c), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 4.
47. Id.
48. 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 10.
49. La. R.S. 23:1212, added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 5.
50. La. R.S. 23:1221(b) and (c), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 6.
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Be that as it may, the standards are now identical. The question
of duration of TTD benefits was also addressed, as it had been in Act
938 of 1988. Only this time, a specific six-month limit was put on such
benefits unless the claimant submits a claim to the hearing officer for
extension, at which point the matter must be administratively resolved. 5'
Miscellaneous
There were certainly other changes wrought by Act 454, many sig-
nificant in the narrow field of their application. The procedure for
resolving a dispute over the medical reimbursement schedule was clar-
ified. 2 An employee's right to benefits is forfeited during a period of
incarceration, unless there is a showing that he has dependents who rely
upon the benefits for their support, in which case they will be paid
directly to such dependents. 3 There is a specific provision that monthly
supplemental earnings benefits may not exceed 4.3 times TTD benefits.1
4
The sanction for misrepresentations concerning benefit payments is
changed, probably to make it easier to prove." Forfeiture of benefits
may also occur, under certain conditions, if the employee does not
answer truthfully when asked about prior injuries, disabilities, or other
medical conditions.
56
There are also significant amendments to Section 1226 relative to
the rehabilitation obligation of the employer. 57 These seem primarily
aimed at overruling the expression in an early decision after the 1983
amendments to the effect that the paramount goal of rehabilitation could
not be simply to return the worker to his same job. 8
Needed clarification as to the authority to approve a settlement may
be found in the amendments to Section 1272, which make it clear that
once a suit is filed against a tortfeasor, the district court hearing the
suit has authority to approve a lump sum settlement or compromise,
and the parties do not have to return to the Director (or to a hearing
officer) for approval.5 9
51. La. R.S. 23:1221(d), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 6.
52. La. R.S. 23:1034.2, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 2.
53. La. R.S. 23:1201.4, added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 5.
54. La. R.S. 23:1202(A), as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 5.
55. La. R.S. 23:1208, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 5. Rather than the
claimant having to be "convicted" of the criminal conduct defined by the section, he
forfeits his compensation rights if he "violates" the section.
56. La. R.S. 23:1208.1, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 5.
57. La. R.S. 23:1226, as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 6.
58. Works v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 501 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 503 So. 2d 480 (1987). See generally Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 291
(Supp 1989).
59. La. R.S. 23:1272(C), added by 1989 La. Acts No. 454, § 7.
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There are also a few incidental "housekeeping" matters with respect
to the intended new procedure involving administrative hearing officers. 6°
Act 454 is effective January 1, 1990, except for Section 12, which
mandates a 5% one-time credit in the manual rate to insureds upon
renewal of outstanding policies after January 1, 1993.
Conclusion
There is little else that needs to be said. This commentary has
attempted to be fair and objective, lauding some changes which were
clearly needed and criticizing those that seem unnecessary. As with so
many other commentaries on the Act, this one must close with the
observation that the constant friction between the employee community,
the employer community, the insurers, and the judiciary does not bode
well for the health of the compensation system. Perhaps this tinkering
will produce the end of such friction, but one is entitled to doubt that
result. Could it be that the various sides to the dispute prefer to continue
to disagree, and to tinker?
JURISPRUDENCE
For once, the judicial side of this commentary is relatively short.
Indeed, there are only two primary developments that deserve discussion,
and they are in areas of the law addressed by the provisions of Act
454 of 1989. Thus, whatever import these developments may have must
be tempered in the light of the provisions of this most recent enactment.
They may perhaps have no importance whatsoever in view of Act 454.
But then again, they may simply provide guidance to the careful reader
as to the way the judiciary will seek to circumvent the provisions of
Act 454.
Mental Stress
It was probably only a matter of time before the various decisions
on this issue over the past fifteen years were gathered together into a
significant pronouncement extending the basis for recovery. In a typical
manner, earlier tentative announcements 6' formed the basis for bolder
60. See La. R.S. 23:1310.5 and 1310.8, both as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 454,
§ 9.
61. See generally, in the mental/physical context, Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 264 La.
204, 270 So. 2d 867 (1972) and McDonald v. International Paper Co., 406 So. 2d 582
(La. 1981). See also Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 217.
[Vol. 50
WORKERS' COMPENSA TION
statements, 62 and suggestions of caution in the application of these
principles 63 were not heeded.
During this term, the supreme court squarely addressed the so-called
mental/mental type of case, in which disabling symptoms of a mental
nature follow some type of non-physical incident or series of incidents
in the workplace. Though it ultimately pegged its decision to a single,
observable incident that occurred on a given work day, there can be
little doubt that the court's broad discussion left a great deal of fertile
ground to be tilled in the gradual mental stress area in the future.
The decision in question is Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center.64 The
worker had been employed at the medical center for about seven years,
in charge of the stocking and distribution of medical supplies. Over
most of that period of time, she had observed what she believed to be
drug use and sale by employees, and had therefore complained to her
supervisor. Probably as a result of her complaints, some friction was
created between her and those co-workers who might have been involved
in such activities. At unspecified times during the last five years of her
employment, there had been instances of vandalism, perhaps aimed at
her. Someone had urinated in an office waste basket, and even into
her coffee pot. Water had been poured into supply bins, ruining the
medical supplies contained there.
Moreover, she believed that the weekend shift (which included at
least one worker that she believed was involved in the drug activities)
which was supposed to keep up with stocking and delivering drugs
through the hospital was not doing its job, leaving a heavier work load
for her on Mondays.
Over a given weekend, the weekend shift workers apparently decided
to bring the issue to a head by declining to stock any supplies. When
the claimant discovered this on Monday, she promptly complained to
the supervisor, who proposed a suspension of the erring workers. This
frightened the claimant, who said they would "get her" if they were
suspended. Moreover, she was told by another worker in that same
meeting that there were "a lot of people around here who want to kick
your butt." Later that same day, she became so upset that she could
not continue to work. She sought and received professional counseling
for her situation, and did not return to work for a number of months
thereafter.
62. See generally, in the mental/mental context at the intermediate appellate level,
Taquino v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 438 So. 2d 625 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 443
So. 2d 597 (1983) and Jones v. City of New Orleans, 514 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ denied, 515 So. 2d 1111 (1987).
63. See Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 235 (2d ed. 1980 and Supp. 1989).
64. 546 So. 2d 138 (La. 1989).
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Because of her inability to work, she sought compensation benefits.
The trial court held that there had been no "accident" and denied
benefits. The court of appeal reversed, granting her benefits for a five-
month period of disability. The supreme court affirmed, holding that
there had been an accident and that the absence of any signs of physical
trauma did not present an obstacle to the award of compensation.
The supreme court's opinion is well researched and well written,
dealing appropriately with the background of the "accident" requirement
and the mental/mental type of case. Though the opinion discusses in
some detail the long history of harassment endured by this claimant in
the workplace, it finally focuses on the Monday morning meeting and
the threats as being the single event that could serve as the triggering
factor to permit the award of compensation. To that extent, the opinion
is faithful to some earlier cases in which there was a single event that
could be described as the basis for the disabling condition.
6
The only problem in this instance is that the event, standing alone,
was very likely not the sole, or even primary, cause for the disabling
condition. The event does not appear to have the characteristics of the
events in earlier decisions (witnessing a serious injury to a co-worker
or witnessing the suicide of a close associate) that might comfortably
be identified as the cause of the disabling condition. The claimant's
condition seemed to have been caused by a series of events over the
five-year period prior to the Monday morning meeting, or by various
other causes outside the workplace during that same five-year period.
If that is true, then the court should have been more concerned about
the competing lines of causation that are necessarily presented when the
condition arises over a long period of time rather than a very short
period of time.
The other interesting decision in this area is Williams v. Regional
Transit Authority.66 The worker was a streetcar operator in New Orleans
who was suspected of theft of fares. After an investigation, and ac-
cusations from co-workers also implicated in similar activities, the worker
was arrested at the end of his shift. So far as the opinion reflects, he
was apparently apprehended in plain view of the occupants of the car,
handcuffed and taken off in a patrol car. The record was unclear on
the disposition of the criminal charges, but apparently they were
"dropped" and the claimant's employer told him he could return to
work.
He tried to do so, but was unable to work in view of the mental
stress that he said had followed this incident. The trial court granted
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Oilfield Scrap & Equip. Co., 482 So. 2d.970 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1986) (co-worker heard gunshot and discovered suicide victim in next room, near
death).
66. 546 So. 2d 150 (La. 1989).
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his request for benefits, but the court of appeal reversed, stating that
"it would be contrary to sound public policy to expand" the compen-
sation statutes to afford recovery. The supreme court granted a writ,
reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court judgment.
Based on its contemporaneous decision in Sparks, the court had no
difficulty concluding that the arrest was an identifiable event that could
be considered an accident. Indeed, on that point, the case was an easier
one than Sparks, since there was little if any evidence of a long series
of events that might have led to the claimant's ultimate mental problems.
Also on the basis of its opinion in Sparks, the court concluded the
absence of any physical trauma was not an obstacle to recovery for
resultant mental stress (though it might have used the physical incident
of handcuffing as such physical trauma if that had been thought to be
necessary).
The primary focus of the opinion in Williams, however, was not
on these issues of accident and mental/mental occurrence, but on whether
the arrest and resultant disability arose out of plaintiff's employment.
To resolve this dispute, the court imposed upon the claimant the burden
of proving that he did not commit any criminal conduct that led to
the arrest, and held that he had discharged that burden. When the
employer failed to rebut that evidence, the court opined that the er-
roneous charges were "plainly employment-related" and thus arose out
of the employment.
Standing alone, these decisions would seem to suggest modifications
in the jurisprudence that point toward expanded recovery for mental
stress that does not have initial physical causes. However, one must
consider the amendments to the Act brought about by Act 454 of 1989
to determine whether cases such as these could be decided in the clai-
mant's favor in the future.
The earlier discussion in this article reveals that, after the 1989
amendments, "mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress
shall not be considered a personal injury by accident ... unless the
mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected and extraordinary
stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence." It will be recalled that the defendant in Sparks
argued that there was no "accident" because the claimant had not
alleged a "single, unexpected, unforeseen and catastrophic event" which
gave rise to her injuries, but rather only a series of such events over
more than six years. The supreme court disagreed, finding the threats
in the Monday morning meeting to constitute such an event. It does
not take much imagination to conceive of a future opinion that would
conclude that a meeting such as that in Sparks would satisfy the new
definition, at least as to its "sudden" and "unexpected" nature. Whether
it was "extraordinary" might be debated, but it should not be difficult
to conclude that it was. Seen in this light, the only part of the revised
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language that might militate against a result such as in Sparks would
be the standard of proof (clear and convincing evidence versus prepon-
derance of the evidence).
A similar observation should be made about Williams. The arrest
outside the streetcar at the end of the work shift would seem to qualify
as "sudden, unexpected and extraordinary," leaving the change in the
standard of proof as the only difference between the statutory language
on which Williams was based and the revised language on which a
future case of its type would be based.
This is not to suggest that some amendments such as those in Act
454 of 1989 might not have been necessary, particularly in light of the
general tenor of the Sparks decision. It is to suggest that the amendment
might not prove to be effective in reversing the result in such cases.
Heart Attack
During this term, the supreme court revisited the troublesome issue
of heart attacks in Carruthers v. PPG Industries, Inc.67 Faithful to its
most recent pronouncements on the subject,6" the court on original
hearing declined to award compensation to the family of a worker who
could not demonstrate that the stress of his job was greater than that
of the average non-worker. The claimants asserted that the test should
be whether the stress of the worker's job was greater than the stress
of his own non-employment life. The supreme court on original hearing
rejected this "subjective" test in favor of a continuation of the "ob-
jective" standard of measuring the claimant's work stress against the
stress of the average non-working individual. But on rehearing, the court
reversed itself and adopted the subjective first urged by the claimants.
The decedent was a man with multiple medical problems including
hypertension and diabetes. For several years prior to the fateful day,
he had repeatedly ascended five steps to reach his office. In the four
months immediately preceding the incident, he was required to ascend
another eight steps when his office was moved from the first floor to
the second floor. On the day in question, he suffered the fatal attack
in the morning immediately following the ascension of these thirteen
steps. The claimants argued that the strain of these additional eight
steps over a four-month period caused the fatal attack.
As indicated earlier, the supreme court ultimately reversed the de-
terminations of both lower courts, choosing a subjective standard and
concluding that the work-related stress on the decedent was in fact
67. 543 So. 2d 472 (La. 1989).
68. See, e.g., Reid v. Gamb, Inc., 509 So. 2d 995 (La. 1987); Guidry v. Sline Indus.




greater than that which he faced in his non-employment pursuits. This
result seems inconsistent with the developing jurisprudence in such mat-
ters since 1982, though it is obvious that the supreme court is deeply
divided on the issue. The result is particularly ironic when one juxtaposes
this subjective standard against the legislative amendment in Act 454 of
1989.
The 1989 amendments will probably impose a more stringent test
for recovery than is contained in the supreme court cases in recent years
and certainly will contain a more rigorous standard than that announced
on rehearing in Carruthers. In the first place, a standard of clear and
convincing evidence is imposed. Moreover, the claimant must demon-
strate that the physical work stress in the job environment was "ex-
traordinary and 'unusual" in comparison with the "stress or exertion
experienced by the average employee in that occupation." This replaces
the consideration of the stress on an average worker in a non-employment
setting with a consideration of the average worker in that same occu-
pation. This arguably returns the law to its interpretation prior to the
somewhat more liberal heart attack decisions of the past decade. 69 And,
of course, the 1989 amendments also require that the physical work
stress "and not some other sources of stress or preexisting condition"
be the "predominant and major cause" of the heart attack or other
vascular accident.
If interpreted as written, these amendments would certainly reverse
the result in a case such as Carruthers, and would probably reverse the
result in some other recent heart attack cases. 70 That was no doubt the
intent of the drafters, and the success of that endeavor will have to
await judicial scrutiny over the coming years, particularly in light of
the ultimate result in Carruthers.
69. See, e.g., Brian v. Employers Cas. Co., 111 So. 2d 161 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959)
and Bertrand v. Coal Operators Cas. Co., 253 La. 1115, 221 So. 2d 816 (1969), among
numerous other such cases. See generally Malone and Johnson, supra note 6, at § 261.
70. See, e.g., Woolsey v. Cotton Bros. Bakery Co., Inc., 535 So. 2d 1119 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1988) (onset of angina during work day was sufficient showing of accident; stress
at work greater than exertion of ordinary non-employment life; compensation allowed);
Hibbard v. M-N Utilities, Inc., 530 So. 2d 1190 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 532
So. 2d 134 (1988) (foreman for water company spent day of fatal heart attack disconnecting
water meters and other relatively minor physical tasks; close case, but court felt exertion
was greater than non-employment life and at least equal to some other cases in which
recovery had been granted; compensation granted, overruling contrary trial court deter-
mination); Gaspard v. State, Through Dept. of Rev. and Taxation, 509 So. 2d 523 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1987); Youngblood v. Rotor Aids, Inc., 491 So. 2d 132 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
writ denied, 494 So. 2d 1177 (1986).
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